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Abstract: The aim of this paper is to study the impact of four different events on the evolution of stock prices 
of Banca Comercială Carpatica, using event study methodology. The series of events ended with a substantial 
change of the bank ownership. In determining the expected returns, we employ two different models: Market 
Model and Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). Our results show that in three out of four events there is a 
significant impact of the event, both in the pre- and in the post-event days from the event window. 
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1 Introduction 
In this paper we study the impact of four events on the evolution of stock price of Banca Comercială 
Carpatica (ticker on Bucharest Stock Exchange: BCC). More precisely, the events we consider are as 
follows (in chronological order): (1) the appointment of a new CEO – Johan Gabriels – as revealed in 
an article by Mediafax press agency on 14/01/2013, being the event day (his appointment was 
approved by the National Bank of Romania on 19/04/2013); (2) the detention and the incrimination of 
Ilie Carabulea, a shareholder of BCC who founded Banca Carpatica in 1999, by the National Anti-
Corruption Department (DNA) on 28/01/2014 – the event day; (3) the sale of 25% indirect stake in the 
bank to American investment fund JC Flowers by issuing new shares, the transaction being firstly 
announced by Ziarul Financiar on 03/09/2015 and (4) as the latter takeover had fallen through, we 
consider another one – the sale of 20% of BCC’s share capital (220,274,282 shares) to Nextebank, the 
event day being the 04/01/2016. 
The goal of this paper is to analyze the impact of some major events on shareholders’ value: the 
change of executives and the change of company’s ownership. By investigating the variation of 
abnormal returns through an event study we determine how the market players react. Given the 
Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) and the rationality in the marketplace, the news should 
immediately be incorporated into the stock price, either in a positive or in a negative way. Otherwise, 
the market is not efficient. Also, knowing how a security is likely to react to a specific event, we can 
predict how other securities are likely to react to similar or different events. 
The value stock price of a company is determined by multiple factors. The agency theory states that 
the Chief Executive Officer’s role, as the agent of the shareholders, is to maximize their wealth. Thus, 
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the CEO change may be considered a major event in a company’s history. Moreover, the role of the 
executive turnover receives even more weight when we consider the banking sector. 
Banca Comercială Carpatica has experienced in the recent years a series of events, four of each are 
being investigateg in this paper, and we consider a challenge to study how the market participants 
have reacted to such events, driving the stock price either upward or downward. Furthermore, BCC is 
one of the most transactionated stock on Bucharest Stock Exchange, which is a sine qua non 
requirement for the validity of the abnormal returns. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next chapter will review the theory on the event 
studies and the empirical literature regarding the executives turnover and ownership change. The 
section 2 will present the data and methodology, while the last two sections will present the results and 
will draw the conclusions of this research.  
 
2 Literature Review 
The impact of the news on the stock prices has been firstly investigated by Dolley (1933), who used 
the event study methodology to determine the behavior of stock prices due to the stock splits. A new 
seminal paper investigated later on the way in which the stock prices are adjusted on the market after 
new information is publicly available (Fama, Fisher, Jensen, & Roll, 1969). Ball & Brown (1968) 
notice that the income report disclosure determines stock price changes and proposes an investigation 
regarding the magnitude of price change due to unexpected income change. Later on, the event study 
methodological approach has been used by Brown & Warner (1985), McWilliamd & Siegel (1997), 
MacKinley (1997) and Binder (1998) who developed and applied it in order to capture the new 
information disclosure effect on stock prices. The rationale under the event study approach is that the 
prices will quickly incorporate the news and generate abnormal returns. Armitage (1995) evaluated the 
different methods of determining the abnormal returns and tested their performance. 
There are numerous types of information that influence the share price behavior: income 
announcements, change in strategy announcements, but also ownership change, merger or acquisition 
decision or CEO turnover.  
Considering the CEO turnover, the literature distinguishes two cases of succession, namely the 
planned change (e.g. retirement) or the unplanned turnover (e.g. resignation, death etc.), while the 
effect of CEO turnover on company’s performance is a function of the manager effect and succession 
effect (Beatty & Zajac, 1987). The magnitude of market reactions to the deaths of CEOs was 
significantly larger in shareholder perceptions of CEO impact towards more recent periods (Quigley, 
Crossland, & Campbell, 2016). In a seminal corporate governance paper, Jensen & Meckling (1976) 
state that the CEO will doubtable seek to maximize the shareholders’ wealth. The poorly-performing 
executives will thus be replaced and, as a consequence, the stock price will rise, signaling the 
effectiveness of the board of directors (Wu & Hsu, 2015). Moreover, the forced turnover may lead to 
higher stock price volatility, even when controlling to multiple factors (Clayton, Hartzel, & 
Rosenberg, 2000). The overall effect for outside successions remains insignificant. However, in the 
empirical literature, the effect of CEO turnover on stock price is inconclusive. It may be followed by a 
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company value reduction (Beatty & Zajac, 1987; Suchard, Singh, & Barr, 2001) or by no average 
stock price reaction (Warner, Watts, & Wruck, 1988). 
Another strain of the event study literature analyzes the effect of the ownership changes on the stock 
price movements. Among other hypothesis, Sanders & Zdanowicz (1992) studied the average 
abnormal returns of corporate control target firms during a period of possibly informed trading. They 
found out that the preannouncement date average abnormal return begins after the unpublicized 
initiation date of the transaction. 
Ali, Durtschi, Lev, & Trombley (2004, p. 1) found out that “the change in institutional ownership of a 
company during a calendar quarter is positively associated with the three-day abnormal returns at the 
time of the subsequent  announcement of the company's quarterly earnings”. Another study describes 
the behaviour of the firm value due to the insider’s ownership purchase: as insider ownership 
increases, the share price first increases, then decrease (McConnell, Servaes, & Lins, 2008). 
 
3 Data and Methodology 
The estimation window for which we use to determine the normal behavior of the stock market factors 
is 250 trading day period prior to the each event window to capture seasonality effects. A 41-day event 
window is employed, comprised of 20 pre-event days, the event day, and 20 post-event days, as in 
MacKinley (1997). The data employed is the daily closing price series of the BCC, downloaded from 
the DataStream database. 
As we have defined the events per se, event days, estimation windows and the event windows, we 
proceed in applying the classical methodology for event studies. This involves four steps: 




   (1) 
where Pt and Pt-1 represent the BCC’s and market portfolio’s stock price at time t and t-1, respectively. 
2. Compute the daily expected returns for the event window period. This will be done using two 
models: Market Model and an economic model, namely the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). 
The Market Model has the following form: 
𝐸(𝑅)𝑡 =∝ +𝛽𝑅𝑚𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡  (2) 
where Rt and Rmt are the period-t returns on BCC and the market portfolio, respectively, and εt is the 
zero mean disturbance term with var(εt) = σ
2
t. α, β and ε are the parameters of the market model to be 
estimated using Ordinary Least Square (OLS) method. The residuals will be tested for autocorrelation 
and heteroskedasticity using Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test up to five lags and ARCH 
LM Test up to five lags, respectively. If we detect only heteroskedasticity, we correct it using White 
method, and if we detect both autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity we will employ Newey-West 
methodology to obtain robust standard errors. As a proxy for market portfolio, we will use Dow Jones 
Total Market Index (DWG), a comprehensive index which represents 77 countries and covers more 
than 98% of the world's market capitalization. Data for the index prices is downloaded from 
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Bloomberg. The appropriateness of the model will depend upon the R2 of the market regression. The 
larger the R2 the greater is the variance reduction of the abnormal return, and the larger is the gain. 
The second model, CAPM, is an extension of the market model: 
𝐸(𝑅)
𝑡
= 𝑟𝑓 + 𝛽[𝐸(𝑅𝑚𝑡) − 𝑟𝑓] + 𝜀𝑡  (3) 
where: 
E(Ri) – expected return on BCC; 
E(Rm) – expected return on the market portfolio; 
β – market (systematic) risk, computed as a ratio between the covariance on the BCC return and 
market portfolio return and the variance of the market portfolio return; 
rf – risk-free asset return; 
εi – standard error for BCC share. 
For the risk-free rate, 10-years Romanian bond yields will be used, from Datastream database. Unlike 
the market model, CAPM imposes additional restriction. One of them is that the intercept equals the 
risk-free rate and hence the variance of the error term will be larger than in the market model. Another 
one is that it is based on a series of hypotheses (Berk & DeMarzo, 2014, pp. 379–380; Hillier, 
Grinblatt, & Titman, 2012, p. 140), as follows:  
a. All the investors have a Markowitz behavior, considering only the variance and mean return of 
the portfolios. 
b. There are no transaction costs or other spending for buying and selling financial assets 
(frictionless markets). 
c. All the investors have homogenous beliefs, that is, estimate identical distributions for the future 
returns. There is a perfect competition between the investors and they will not try to beat the market 
by an active administration of the portfolios. 
d. The stock markets are in equilibrium. The financial assets are correctly evaluated. 
e. The time horizon of the investments is identical for all investors. 
However, it is still widely used in financial research and literature to determining expected returns of 
assets. 
3. Compute daily abnormal returns of the BCC, as the returns in excess of its expected returns 
after compensating for risk: 
𝑨𝑹𝒕 = 𝑹𝒕 − 𝑬(𝑹𝒕)  (4) 
To prove the significance of the abnormal returns for each day in the event window period, testing is 





  (5) 
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4. Finally, we sum the average abnormal returns over the T days for any interval in the event 
window to get the Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR): 
𝑪𝑨𝑹𝑻(𝒕𝟏, 𝒕𝟐) = ∑ 𝑨𝑹
𝒕𝟐
𝒕=𝒕𝟏
t              (6) 
 
4 Empirical Results 
Table no. 1 reports the descriptive statistics for the abnormal returns on event windows for each event 
in particular, from both Market Model and CAPM (41 trading days). An examination of the 
characteristics displayed above, shows that for the first event - the appointment of a new CEO – with 
the event window lasting from 17/12/2012 to 11/02/2013, the mean abnormal returns were the highest, 
using market model, but also more volatile (riskier) in comparison with the other three events, as 
measured by the standard deviation: the detention and the incrimination of Ilie Carabulea (event 
window – from 31/12/2013 to 25/02/2014), the sale of 25% indirect stake in the BCC to American 
investment fund JC Flowers (event window – from 06/08/2015 to 01/10/2015) and the sale of 20% of 
BCC’s share capital to Nextebank (event window – from 07/12/2015 to 01/02/2016). The less risky 
abnormal returns appear to be for the second event – it could be a sign that the investors have not 
perceived the event in such a bad manner, even though the ARs were negative. Table no. 1 also 
exhibits the skewness and excess kurtosis for the series of each event. With the exception of the fourth 
event, the positive value of the skewness show that the distribution of abnormal returns has a long 
right tail. Furthermore, for the first and third event, the value of kurtosis in greater than 3, meaning 
that the distribution is peaked (leptokurtic) relative to the normal; for the second and fourth event, the 
value of kurtosis is closer to 3, which means that the distribution of ARs is close to the normal. This is 
also revealed by the Jarque-Bera test, for which we fail to reject the null hypothesis for the second and 
fourth event and conclude that the distributions of these abnormal returns is normal. 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for the abnormal returns 
 Event 1 Event 2 Event 3 Event 4 
MM CAPM MM CAPM MM CAPM MM CAPM 
 Mean 0.0095 -0.0228 -0.0031 -0.0387 0.0017 -0.0072 0.0005 0.0490 
 Median 0.0027 -0.0290 -0.0022 -0.0377 0.0011 -0.0077 0.0030 0.0524 
 Maximum 0.1425 0.1117 0.0434 0.0073 0.1019 0.0931 0.0575 0.1056 
 Minimum -0.0527 -0.0834 -0.0426 -0.0776 -0.0305 -0.0395 -0.0847 -0.0347 
 Std. Dev. 0.0365 0.0368 0.0175 0.0174 0.0217 0.0217 0.0326 0.0324 
 Skewness 2.1243 2.1803 0.5786 0.5628 2.3290 2.3240 -0.4713 -0.4706 
 Kurtosis 8.2244 8.3093 4.0371 3.9866 12.5758 12.5840 3.0411 3.0552 
 Jarque-Bera 
test 
77.4635 80.6387 4.1252 3.8274 193.7125 193.8193 1.5206 1.5184 
 Prob. J.-B. 0.0000 0.0000 0.1271 0.1475 0.0000 0.0000 0.4675 0.4680 
 First event – the appointment of a new CEO 
The results from the regression in applying the Market Model are the following: 
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Table 2. Summary statistics from the OLS regression (1st event) 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
α 0.33196* 0.011375 2.918412 0.0038 
β 0.50825* 0.165005 3.080247 0.0023 
R2 0.036992 
S.E. of regression 0.020695 
*Significant at 1% level. 
The R2 from this regression is very low (3.69%) meaning that only 3.69% of the variation of the BCC 
returns is explained by the variation of the market index returns. Thus, the appropriateness of the 
Market Model in estimating abnormal returns may be doubtful. However, using other proxies for 
market portfolio (S&P 500 and BET indices) exhibits even lower results. The β corresponds to 
systematic risk and will be also used in computing expected returns with the economic model. 
The results from both market model and CAPM show that there was indeed a positive impact on the 
BCC’s stock prices when the Mediafax firstly revealed the appointment of a new CEO, the abnormal 
returns being non-negative and statistically significant at 1% on 14/01/2013. This means that the 
actual returns were larger than the expected returns. Moreover, on the day -4 and -3 the abnormal 
returns were even higher and statistically significant which may be a sign that the market was 
expecting such a change, although it has been initially denied by the main shareholder. In the 
following days, however, the market adjusted its positive reaction, being reported significant negative 
ARs (MM – day +5; CAPM – days +2, +4, +5, +9, +13, +17 and +19). 
 
Figure 1. CARs from MM and CAPM (1st event) 
As it may be noticed in the above graph, in the interval [-20,-7] the market reacted normally and just 
few days before the announcement it has seen the news as a good one and has incorporated the 
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information into the stock price (the MM line). The trend continued in the day +1 but having a slightly 
constant path thereafter. On the other hand, CAPM shows opposite results, CAR decreasing constantly 
and increasing just before the news had been released, to follow the same trend in the post-event days. 
Thus, the market overreacted to the news considering it rather negative than positive in the post-event 
days. 
 Second event – the detention and incrimination of Ilie Carabulea, the founder and main 
stockholder of BCC 
The results from regression equation (2) are shown in the below table: 
Table 3. Summary statistics from the OLS regression (2nd event) 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
α 0.000452 0.001029 0.439015 0.6610 
β 0.368081** 0.150828 2.440401 0.0154 
R2 0.014994 
S.E. of regression 0.015931 
** Significant at 5% level. 
Note: As the residuals suffer from heteroskedasticity, the standard errors and covariance are White 
heteroskedasticity-consistent. 
Again, the R2 is very low (1.49%), suggesting that the results in applying the market model for 
computing expected returns and further abnormal returns may not be consistent. The systematic risk, 
or β is 0.368, meaning that Banca Carpatica has had a lower risk in the estimation window than the 
market index, which is assumed to have a beta of 1. 
Employing the market model, it may be noticed that in the day when Ilie Carabulea has been arrested 
the abnormal return was negative (-1.93%), but statistically insignificant. It was negative and 
statistically significant at 10% level in the day -3 and +1 (5% level) and followed an alternate trend. 
CAPM exhibits divergent results. It shows that the market has anticipated the event, having negative 
and statistically significant abnormal returns for almost all the days from the pre-event and post-event 
day. The AR in the event day was -5.45% and significant at 1% level. 
In the plot of the cumulative abnormal returns obtained with both models the market has perceived the 
news as a bad one with CAPM, having a decreasing trend all over the event window period. Moreover, 
it has anticipated it. As when it comes to the market model, it seems that the market has not 
anticipated the news, having a slightly negative reaction in the post event days, especially in the 
interval [0, +4]. 
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Figure 2. CARs from MM and CAPM (2nd event) 
 Third event - the sale of 25% indirect stake in the BCC to American investment fund JC Flowers 
 
Table 4. Summary statistics from the OLS regression (3rd event) 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
α -0.001627 0.001591 -1.022698 0.3075 
β 0.806292* 0.256473 3.143776 0.0019 
R2 0.038474 
S.E. of regression 0.025104 
*Significant at 1% level. 
Table 4 displays the results from the OLS regression in applying the market model for the third event 
under investigation. The R2 variable is only 3.84%, but greater when we use as a proxy for market 
portfolios other indices, such as S&P 500 or BET. 
On 03/09/2015 when the news of takeover was released by Ziarul Financiar, the market has reacted 
positively and has perceived the news as a good one, incorporating the information into the stock 
price. Both MM and CAPM show a positive and statistically significant abnormal return in the event 
day (10.19%, 1% level of significance and 9.31%, significant at 1% level, respectively). However, 
ARs are negative, but not statistically significant in the majority of the days from the event window. 
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Figure 3. CARs from MM and CAPM (3rd event) 
As regarding to CARs, it may be noticed that in case of MM model the market has reacted positively 
even after the announcement of the event, with increasing cumulative abnormal returns especially for 
[+13, +20] interval. Using CAPM, on the other hand, shows that before the news being released the 
market hasn’t reacted whatsoever; it was only the announcement day when the CAR had increased 
significantly just to start to decrease thereafter. One explanation may be that, as the deal had fallen 
through, that the market has anticipated this. However, involving MM, the market does not seem to 
anticipate this. 
 Fourth event - the sale of 20% of BCC’s share capital to Nextebank 
 
Table 5 Summary statistics from the OLS regression (4th event) 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
α 0.001692 0.004956 0.341428 0.3075 
β 2.281534* 0.640936 3.559690 0.0019 
R2 0.048611 
S.E. of regression 0.078361 
* Significant at 1% level. 
 
It is worth noting that for this estimation window, the beta of BCC is much larger than in other 
analyzed periods. This means that the market risk of Banca Carpatica was two times larger than of 
DJW. 
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For this event, our results show that there was indeed a positive abnormal return in the event day, but 
statistically insignificant. Furthermore, for the entire event window, ARs are statistically insignificant. 
 
Figure 4. CARs from MM and CAPM (4th event) 
Figure 4 exhibits positive CARs when using CAPM in determining expected returns. The cumulative 
abnormal returns are increasing constantly over the event window but, as it has been mentioned 
before, the ARs are not statistically significant. One explanation for this could be the fact that as the 
previous takeover bid had come to nothing, the market was not confident on the realization degree of 
this sale offer and has reacted accordingly. 
 
5 Conclusions 
In this paper we study the impact of four events on the evolution of stock price of Banca Comercială 
Carpatica, that conclude with an ownership change. The announcement regarding the new CEO 
appointment produced an overreaction of the market to the news, considering it rather negative than 
positive in the post-event days. The detention and incrimination of the founder and main stockholder 
of BCC was not anticipated by the market but the reaction was slightly negative in the post event days. 
The sale of 25% indirect stake in the BCC to American investment fund JC Flowers determined a 
significant increase of the abnormal returns only during the announcement day, just to start to decrease 
thereafter. One explanation may be that, as the deal had fallen through, that the market has anticipated 
this. On the other hand, the sale of 20% of BCC’s share capital to Nextebank determined a positive 
abnormal return in the event day, but statistically insignificant. Cumulative abnormal returns increased 
constantly over the event window but the ARs were not statistically significant. An explanation for 
this could be the fact that as the previous takeover bid had come to nothing, the market was not 
confident on the realization degree of this sale offer and has reacted accordingly. 
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